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Anticipatory child fostering and household
economic security in Malawi
Lauren K. Bachan 1
Abstract
BACKGROUND
While there is a rich literature on the practice of child fostering in sub-Saharan Africa,
little is known about how fostering impacts receiving households, as few studies con-
sider household conditions both before and after fostering. Despite the fact that circum-
stances surrounding fostering vary, the literature’s key distinction of fostering is often
drawn along the simple line of whether or not a household is fostering a child. This paper
argues that anticipation of fostering responsibilities, in particular, is a useful dimension to
distinguish fostering experiences for receiving households.
OBJECTIVE
This paper examines the relationship between receiving a foster child and subsequent
changes in household wealth. Particular emphasis is placed on how these changes are
conditioned by differing levels of anticipation of the fostering event.
METHODS
This study uses data from Tsogolo la Thanzi (TLT), a longitudinal survey in Balaka,
Malawi. Using data from 1754 TLT respondents, ﬁxed effects pooled time-series mod-
els are estimated to assess whether and how receiving a foster child changes household
wealth.
RESULTS
This paper demonstrates the heterogeneity of fostering experiences for receiving house-
holds. The results show that households that anticipate fostering responsibilities experi-
ence a greater increase in household wealth than both households that do not foster and
those that are surprised by fostering.
1 The Pennsylvania State University. 211 Oswald Tower. University Park, PA 16802, USA. Tel: 617-997-9078.
E-Mail: lkl5044@psu.edu.
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CONCLUSION
Households that anticipate fostering responsibilities exhibit the greatest increase in house-
hold wealth. While fostering households that do not anticipate fostering responsibilities
may not experience these gains, there is no evidence to indicate that such households are
negatively impacted relative to households that do not foster. This ﬁnding suggests that
additional childcare responsibilities may not be as detrimental to African households as
some researchers have feared.
1. Introduction
Child fostering—the custom of children living outside of the natal home—is practiced
throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa (Bledsoe 1990; Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe
1989; Goody 1982; Madhavan 2004; Monasch and Boerma 2004; Urassa et al. 1997).
Although the practice varies from region to region, fostering is commonly thought to
be a mutually beneﬁcial arrangement between sending and receiving households (Bled-
soe 1990; Caldwell 1997; Drah 2012; Isiugo-Abanihe 1985). Empirical work recognizes
child fostering as a strategy African households use to distribute the cost of childrearing
and offset economic insecurities by sending children to be fostered by other households
(Akresh 2005; Eloundou-Enyegue and Shapiro 2004).
Three facts about child fostering have been well established in the qualitative and
ethnographic literature but are underdeveloped in survey research. First, child fostering
is part of a larger negotiation process that takes place among extended family networks
(Akresh 2005; Caldwell 1997). Second, receiving a foster child happens under a variety
of circumstances (Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe 1989; Goody 1982). Third, ethnographies
further suggest that households that receive foster children beneﬁt from the added labor
of the foster child and from the social insurance of investing in other people’s children
(Bledsoe 1990; Caldwell 1997). However, the tangible beneﬁts for receiving families
remain largely unexplored and are less established in quantitative research.
Thispaperexplorestheeconomicconsequencesofchildfosteringforreceivinghouse-
holds in southern Malawi. Using intensive longitudinal data, I track the incidence of child
fostering over an approximately two and a half year time period in order to test competing
hypotheses about how fostering a child triggers changes in household wealth. The results
demonstrate that receiving a foster child as part of an anticipated arrangement is asso-
ciated with improved household wealth over time. Although further research is needed
to examine the mechanisms underlying these ﬁndings, this study provides initial insights
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into how receiving households are affected by child fostering and how the heterogeneity
of the fostering experience differentially contributes to household economic outcomes.
2. Households and child fostering in sub-Saharan Africa
Households are units that consist of individuals who make joint decisions regarding con-
sumption and production, labor force participation, savings, and capital acquisition
(Becker 1991). The description of a household as an economic unit is particularly rele-
vant in much of sub-Saharan Africa, where subsistence agriculture is a primary livelihood
for many people. Household structure in sub-Saharan Africa tends to be complex, with
members extending beyond the nuclear family. While the speciﬁcs vary from society to
society, households containing multiple generations (vertical complexity) and extended
family members (horizontal complexity) are common throughout the region (Bongaarts
2001; McDaniel and Zulu 1996; Van de Walle 2006).
Child fostering adds to the compositional complexity of households in sub-Saharan
Africa. Unlike Western societies, where fostering is regulated by state governments, the
vast majority of child fostering in Africa is akin to informal parenting, namely when a
child is reared by another family (or multiple families) for extended periods of time in
the absence of government intervention (Goody 1982). Much of the classic fostering lit-
erature focuses on West Africa, but the practice of child fostering is widespread across
other regions of Africa as well (Bicego, Rutstein, and Johnson 2003; Madhavan 2004;
McDaniel and Zulu 1996; Monasch and Boerma 2004; Urassa et al. 1997). Furthermore,
fostering in Africa takes place under a variety of circumstances. Children are fostered
when their natal parents can no longer fulﬁll their parental roles because of illness, di-
vorce, or death (Goody 1982). Foster children are also frequently sent to live with non-
natal family members as part of a deliberate, and often mutually-beneﬁcial, arrangement
(Madhavan 2004; McDaniel and Zulu 1996).
Arichliteratureonthefunctionsofchildfosteringinsub-SaharanAfricademonstrates
that, in addition to managing crises (e.g., death of a parent), fostering is used to strengthen
kinship ties; share the cost of childrearing (Goody 1982); and smooth demographic in-
equalities, such as childlessness or unfavorable gender composition of existing children
(Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe 1989; Isiugo-Abanihe 1985; Lloyd and Desai 1992). Ad-
ditionally, fostering acts as a safety net for families and often expands children’s oppor-
tunities for upward social mobility, particularly in the form of access to education and
occupational training (Ainsworth and Filmer 2006; Akresh 2009; Bledsoe 1990; Isiugo-
Abanihe 1985).
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3. Household economics and fostering
Studies of the various purposes of child fostering have emphasized that the practice of
sending and receiving children is a strategy households employ to distribute the costs
and beneﬁts of children. In other words, child fostering is one way in which households
can offset economic insecurities (Akresh 2005; Caldwell 1997; Eloundou-Enyegue and
Shapiro 2004; Isiugo-Abanihe 1985). Such frameworks imply that the consequences of
fostering for receiving households should be measured in economic terms. However, de-
spite the theoretically established economic links between receiving and households, the
questions of whether and to what extent fostering triggers changes in wealth for receiving
households remain unanswered.
This gap stems from two fundamental characteristics of the literature. First, since the
onset of the AIDS epidemic in the region, research on fostering in Africa has almost en-
tirely focused on the educational, health, and developmental disadvantages of children—
particularly of orphans (Beegle et al. 2010a; Beegle et al. 2010b; Case et al. 2004; Cluver
et al. 2007; Cluver and Orkin 2009; Deininger et al. 2003; Monasch and Boerma 2004;
Subbarao et al. 2001; for a notable exception, see Ainsworth and Filmer 2006). Evidence
that foster children—especially those who are not biologically related to the household
head—face disadvantages has given the impression that households have been struggling
to meet the demands of fostering. However, there are reasons to believe that fostering is
not overwhelming families. In the face of the AIDS epidemic, households have shown a
remarkable ability to care for both orphaned and non-orphaned foster children (Caldwell
1997; Grant and Yeatman 2012; Hosegood et al. 2007a; Monasch and Boerma 2004).
Second, the small literature that does consider fostering and household economics
focuses primarily on the absolute differences between fostering and non-fostering house-
holds.2 From this body of research we know that foster children tend to live in wealthier
households (Beegle et al. 2010a; Bicego, Rutstein, and Johnson 2003; Weinreb, Gerland,
and Fleming 2008), suggesting that selection effects are key in understanding foster child
placement. However, without explicitly measuring change in wealth in response to fos-
tering a child, we cannot discern with any certainty whether foster children are initially
placed in wealthier households or whether households become wealthier as a result of
receiving.
Further complicating matters is the fact that empirical research treats fostering con-
ceptuallyandmethodologicallyasan“unanticipatedshock”(literally, suchasinDeininger
et al. 2003). Much of the broader literature, however, indicates that fostering happens un-
2One notable exception comes from a case study in Uganda, for which researchers used two waves of panel
data to show that receiving a foster child was associated with a signiﬁcant reduction in household investment
(as measured by agricultural, structural, and transport equipment) over an eight year period (Deininger, Garcia,
and Subbarao 2003). This study, however, conceptualizes fostering solely as a binary shock to the household.
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der a variety of circumstances (Goody 1982; Madhavan 2004; McDaniel and Zulu 1996),
and research on decision-making and networks in Africa suggests that fostering a child
is not normally an unanticipated shock. Rather, fostering is part of a process of constant
negotiation and risk-assessment, in which social networks and extended family play inte-
gral roles (Akresh 2005; Caldwell 1997). Foster parents often volunteer to take children
(Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe 1989) or, at a minimum, anticipate that they will do so in the
future (Johnson-Hanks 2006; Ntozi 1995; Trinitapoli and Weinreb 2012). Such evidence
suggests that anticipation is an important dimension by which to examine the fostering
experiences of receiving households.
3.1 Epidemiological context
Over the past 30 years the AIDS epidemic is thought to have disrupted the long-standing
fostering process by increasing the number of orphans.3 Evidence that less-preferred
types of caretakers (e.g., poor or non-traditional family members) are beginning to play
a larger role in fostering children (Howard et al. 2006; Nyambedha, Wandibba, and
Aagaard-Hansen 2003) indicates that AIDS has altered the normative patterns of foster-
ing. For instance, in her in-depth study of three communities across Botswana (a country
with high HIV-prevalence), Dahl (2009) ﬁnds that many community members believe that
traditional kin-based fostering is failing to provide sufﬁcient care for children.
Despite any disruptions to fostering in the context of the AIDS epidemic, the nature
of the disease may have elongated the fostering negotiation/expectation process, making
anticipation of fostering responsibilities a pertinent dimension by which to evaluate if and
how receiving a foster child impacts household wealth. AIDS has a long latent period, and
its symptoms are almost certainly diagnosed by family members and friends as the disease
progresses. Sick parents make contingency plans for their children in preparation for their
own impending mortality (Klaits 2010). For example, when Malawian parents know they
are HIV positive, they are more likely to invest in their children’s future by enrolling
them in school (Grant 2008). Across sub-Saharan Africa, children are at the forefront of
AIDS-related decision making and conversations (Dahl 2009). In rural Malawi, people
recognize AIDS as a “profound danger” to children (Watkins 2004:694) and often evoke
child wellbeing into the discourse on prevention strategies (Smith and Watkins 2005;
Watkins 2004).
3Between 1990 and 2009, the number of children in sub-Saharan Africa who were orphaned due to AIDS
increased from less than one million to 14.8 million (UNAIDS 2007, 2010).
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3.2 Competing hypotheses on economic outcomes for receiving households
In the simplest terms there are two ways in which fostering a child could impact the
wealth of a receiving household: Wealth could either increase or decrease in response to
fostering. Existing empirical and theoretical evidence lends support for both competing
possibilities.
Drawing from Caldwell’s wealth ﬂow theory (1976; 1983), which acknowledges the
unique value of children in developing settings, fostering a child may increase household
wealth through added domestic labor. Foster children (especially girls) can be sources of
cheap domestic labor within fostering households (Ainsworth and Filmer 2006; Bledsoe
1990; Goody 1982), freeing up time for other household members to participate in eco-
nomically productive endeavors.4 Beneﬁts of fostering can also extend beyond what a
household receives from the foster child. Mende grandmothers in Sierra Leone and Igbo
women in Nigeria often receive food and money from natal parents in return for fostering
their grandchildren (Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe 1989; Isiugo-Abanihe 1985). In other
contexts, people who take in children from outside their kin group do so with the explicit
expectation of receiving material compensation (Dahl 2009). Taken together, this evi-
dence suggests the following:
Hypothesis 1: Household wealth will increase in response to receiving a foster child.
Adding a young dependent to a household could, on the other hand, drain family re-
sources leading to a decrease in household wealth. This may be especially true when
households are already impoverished and/or when fostering takes place in response to a
family crisis. Households that foster children in response to parental illness or death often
suffer ﬁnancially, as other ill effects of a family crisis (e.g., funeral and/or medical costs)
are exacerbated by increased dependency ratios (Hosegood et al. 2007b). Additionally,
the current AIDS epidemic and resulting increase in the number of orphans in the re-
gion may be intensifying the challenges foster families face (Grant and Yeatman 2012;
Hosegood et al. 2007b). Recent studies show that in high HIV-prevalent areas, poorer
households are playing a larger role in child fostering today than they have in the past
(Bicego, Rutstein, and Johnson 2003). While we have thus far been unable to establish if
these households were poor when they began fostering or became poor because of foster-
4Wealth ﬂow perspectives also highlight disincentives for natal families to out-foster their children. Because
children are signiﬁcant sources of social insurance, sending families may be reluctant to voluntarily foster out
their children. However, fostering is not a zero-sum game with only one family claiming the beneﬁts of a child.
Out-fostering does not typically entail the relinquishment of parental rights (Goody 1982), thus natal families
can still expect to receive future beneﬁts from their out-fostered children. Seen this way, fostering is a strategic
decision on part of the sending family such that the beneﬁts of sending the child to be fostered outweigh those
of keeping the child (Akresh 2005).
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ing, the following could be true:
Hypothesis 2: Household wealth will decrease in response to receiving a foster child.
4. Data, measures, and methods
4.1 Data
To test these competing hypotheses, this study focuses on Malawi, a country with a strong
tradition of child fostering (Bandawe and Louw 1997; Munthali 2002). In 2010, approxi-
mately 28% of households were fostering a child under the age of 18 (National Statistical
Ofﬁce and ICF Macro 2011). Malawi is experiencing one of the most severe AIDS epi-
demics in sub-Saharan Africa, with an adult prevalence rate estimated at 11%. AIDS
alone has orphaned more than half a million children in the country (UNAIDS 2010).
Because institutionalized foster care is considered a last resort in Malawi, the majority of
additional child care responsibilities resulting from the AIDS epidemic takes place within
households (Munthali 2002).
The data used come from Tsogolo la Thanzi (TLT), a panel study ﬁelded in the Balaka
district of southern Malawi. TLT collected eight waves of data at four-month intervals
between June 2009 and January 2012 from an initial random sample of 1500 female
and 600 male respondents (initial response rate of 95.6%). Respondents were randomly
selected from a sampling frame of 15- to 25-year-olds living in census enumeration areas
within seven kilometers of the district capital—an area including Balaka township and
the surrounding rural villages. I use data from Waves 1-8, making adjustments to the data
structure to reﬂect the sequencing of events and the changes being measured (discussed
in greater detail below).
Three features make the TLT data uniquely suitable for assessing changes within
households. First, TLT gathers both individual-level characteristics and household-level
information, including ownership of household goods and household rosters, which each
respondent updates at every wave. Second, the longitudinal design is optimal for measur-
ing change over time. Finally, the short intervals between survey waves allow economic
ﬂuctuations to be examined over brief periods of time, something researchers are often
unable to examine in panel studies in which years pass between data collection waves.
One limitation of the TLT data is that it is a sample of young adults, many of whom
are not the head of their household and some of whom share the same household. I han-
dle the latter limitation by including only one respondent from each household sampled.
While I do not assume that respondents are the primary caretaker of any fostered child,
I do assess each respondent’s socio-demographic characteristics—in addition to house-
hold characteristics—as proxies for household dynamics. In other words, I assume that
http://www.demographic-research.org 1163Bachan: Anticipatory child fostering and household economic security in Malawi
the respondent’s characteristics (e.g., income, education, etc.) reasonably reﬂect their
household.
I restrict the TLT sample in four ways. First, to accommodate my analytic approach
(discussed below), I omit data from Wave 1—with the exception of the anticipation
measure—from the analysis. This omission results in the exclusion of 143 individuals
who only contributed data to Wave 1 or who provided fewer than two waves of data in
Waves 2-8 (the average number of waves per respondents is 6.3). Second, because I am
interested in households, I remove 41 respondents who are living primarily in educational
institutions (e.g., boarding schools or universities) rather than a traditional household.
Third, 119 households in the TLT sample contain more than one respondent. In these
cases I randomly select one member to represent his or her household. This results in re-
moving 129 respondents.5 Finally, I further restrict the sample to respondents for whom
complete information was available on the measures used in this analysis. Missing data
are rare and employing listwise deletion removed an additional 13 respondents, result-
ing in a ﬁnal study sample of 1754 individuals who contribute 10,987 person-waves to
the pooled data. As shown in Appendix A (Table A1), the initial and analytic samples
are quite comparable, suggesting that sample selection bias is not introduced by these
restrictions.
4.2 Measures
4.2.1 Household wealth
The outcome measure is the household’s wealth. Wealth is measured on a linear index
comprising nine durable goods and one household asset. Unlike wealth indices that in-
clude several structural assets (e.g., ﬂooring material, water supply, sanitation, etc.), this
index relies heavily on durable goods within the household in order to better capture eco-
nomic ﬂuctuation over the relatively short timespan of the study. The goods used in the
index include a bed with a mattress, a television, a radio, a landline or mobile phone, a re-
frigerator, a bicycle, a motorcycle, an animal-drawn cart, and an automobile. The wealth
measure also considers whether or not the household has electricity.
Weights are calculated for each asset using principal-components analysis following
the same procedure used to construct the Demographic Health Survey wealth index. The
resulting index places households on a continuous scale relative to the sample (Filmer
and Pritchett 2001; Howe, Hargreaves, and Huttly 2008; Rutstein and Johnson 2004).
This approach to measuring wealth–something difﬁcult to accurately estimate in devel-
5In some cases, there were more than two respondents per household, which is why more than 119 respondents
were removed at random. Supplementary analyses including all respondents showed that the results are not
signiﬁcantly different from the results presented in this paper.
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oping countries–has been validated by previous researchers (Filmer and Pritchett 2001;
Howe, Hargreaves, and Huttly 2008). To ensure factorial invariance, the weights are kept
consistent across waves. No item received a negative weight. In this study, television
and electricity are assigned the largest weights and the lowest weights are given to an
animal-drawn cart and bicycle.
4.2.2 Child fostering
To explore the effect of fostering on household wealth, I measure the incidence of fos-
tering within the study period. Because it is impossible to know whether a respondent’s
household was fostering a child before the TLT study began, I assume that no households
were fostering at the baseline wave. While it is likely that some respondents’ house-
holds were fostering a child at the outset of the study, this assumption is reasonable for
the purpose of making inferences about the consequences of new fostering experiences.
The incidence of child fostering is measured in two distinct ways. First, based on each
respondent’s self-report of having a non-biological child join his or her household since
his or her last interview, I use a binary indicator for whether each respondent’s household
fostered a child between waves (1=yes, 0=no).
The second measure is a categorical variable that takes into account respondents’ an-
ticipation of the fostering event. I created this variable using the binary indicator in com-
bination with information about anticipation from the preceding wave. At each wave,
respondents were asked, “In the next year, how likely is it that you will foster a new child
in your household?”. Responses were measured through an interactive technique wherein
the respondent was given a set of 10 beans and asked to shift the number of beans to a
small plate to represent the likelihood of a future event, with a greater number of beans
indicating a higher likelihood.6 Combining answers to this question with the report of
whether the respondent’s household fostered a child in the subsequent wave, I categorize
respondents into four groups: 1) respondents whose household fostered a child but indi-
cated in the previous wave that there was no likelihood of their household fostering in the
coming year (zero beans at the previous wave), 2) those whose household fostered and
anticipated those responsibilities (10 beans at the previous wave), 3) respondents whose
household fostered a child but were uncertain about whether or not they would foster in
the future (one to nine beans at the previous wave), and 4) respondents whose household
did not foster between waves (reference group). These cut-points for the categories were
6The interviewer introduces this method of questioning by asking respondents simple questions about frequent
events. The interviewer gradually moves to more complex questions to ensure the respondents understand the
interactive nature of the questioning. This approach has previously been used and validated by Delavande and
Kohler (2009) and is described in detail in Trinitapoli and Yeatman (2011).
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not determined empirically to ensure any speciﬁc distribution or results, but were deﬁned
conceptually.7
To clarify the complexity of this measure, Figure 1 illustrates how the longitudinal
data were leveraged to create the categorical fostering variable. Figure 1 depicts hypo-
thetical Respondents A, B, and C, all of whom fostered a child at least once during the
seven-wave interval, while hypothetical Respondent D did not foster during this time pe-
riod. Respondent A reported fostering a child at Wave 2 after indicating at Wave 1 that
there was no likelihood (zero beans) of doing so. Respondent A is a fosterer in the binary
sense and, speciﬁcally, a “surprised fosterer” in categorical terms from Wave 2 onward.
At Wave 4, Respondent B reported fostering a child and is treated as a fosterer over the
subsequent waves. Because Respondent B did not contribute data to Wave 3, her level of
anticipation at Wave 2 (10 beans) was used, categorizing her as an anticipated fosterer.8
Respondent C reported fostering twice: both at Wave 3 and Wave 5.9 This respondent re-
mained a fosterer, in binary terms, from Wave 3 onward, but moved from an “uncertain”
fosterer to an “anticipated” fosterer in the categorical measure based on the different level
of anticipation preceding the second fostering event.
Figure 1: Construction of the anticipatory fostering variable
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
Respondent A
Respondent B
Respondent C
Respondent D
0 beans
(Surprised) Fosterer
5 beans 10 beans missed wave
(Anticipated) Fosterer
10 beans 6 beans
(Uncertain) Fosterer
10 beans
(Anticipated) Fosterer
0 beans 0 beans 5 beans 7 beans 5 beans 3 beans
Fostering event
Number of beans indicates level of anticipation of fostering within the next year.
Non-Fosterer
Non-Fosterer
Non-Fosterer
Non-Fosterer
Indicates length of time spent in given fostering status (Type of status in italics. Anticipatory category in parentheses). 
Connects the fostering event to the wave at which level of anticipation is used to categorize fostering by type.
7Ancillary models were estimated to test different categories that deﬁne surprised, anticipated, and uncertain
fostering. Expanding the surprised and anticipated categories by one bean each and restricting the uncertain
category by two beans did not change the results of the multivariate analysis. A discussion and presentation of
these models can be found in Appendix B.
8There were only eight respondents who fostered a child and did not contribute data to the preceding wave. In
these cases, the anticipation used to categorize them was always obtained from within one year prior to fostering.
9For respondents who reported fostering more than one time over the course of the study, the categorical
variable of fostering was updated to reﬂect the most recent fostering experience, but the binary fostering variable
remained constant.
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4.2.3 Control variables
I adjust for time-varying socio-demographic variables that the literature establishes as im-
portant predictors of wealth. All control variables are treated as intervening variables—
that is, they happen after fostering has occurred. Household size is a continuous measure
of the number of people who regularly sleep at the respondent’s house and was derived
from the household roster, which was updated at every wave. To measure the effect of
adding additional household members other than a foster child and to ensure the effect of
fostering is not captured in changes in household size, one household member was sub-
tracted for households that fostered. Marital status is a binary measure that distinguishes
respondents who are currently single from those who are married or cohabiting. Edu-
cational attainment is a continuous measure of the highest level of education completed
by the respondent. In addition to educational attainment I include a dummy variable that
signiﬁes whether the respondent was enrolled in school at each interview wave. Income
is measured in Malawian Kwacha, and represents the amount of money the respondent
reported making in the month preceding his or her interview (referred to as “monthly
income” in subsequent tables). An indicator of survey wave is included as a proxy for
time and adjusts for any maturation effect as individuals move through the life course.10
Finally, a dummy variable for whether the respondent moved houses between interviews
is included to account for discontinuity in the household rosters.
4.3 Analytic approach
I use ﬁxed-effects pooled time series models to estimate the effect of fostering on subse-
quent changes in household wealth. Fixed effects procedures use within-individual differ-
ences to estimate the difference between person-level variance across groups that did and
did not experience a given event within the observed time period. Fixed effects models
have several advantages for estimating the effects of events on continuous outcomes in
panel data, two of which are particularly salient for the present study (see Allison 1994
and Johnson 1995 for a detailed description of the costs and beneﬁts of this modeling
strategy). First, ﬁxed effects models allow for the inclusion of respondents who have not
contributed information to every wave. This is especially appropriate for intensive lon-
gitudinal studies, such as TLT, in which respondents may miss waves due to temporary
migration or illness without attriting from the sample entirely. Second, ﬁxed-effects pro-
cedures account for both observed and unobserved time-invariant characteristics. This
10After respondents who skipped an interview or interviewed at an unscheduled time have been accounted for,
the time between interviews ranges from one to seven months for the analytic sample. However, the average
length of time between interviews was four months, with 80% of respondents interviewing consistently at that
interval. Supplementary analyses, which use the exact interview date, produce highly similar results.
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ensures the model estimates are independent of selection bias and all other time-invariant
differences between respondents (Allison 1994).
Fixed effects models rely on a mean-deviation algorithm that computes the means
over time for all time-varying variables (both dependent and independent) for each indi-
vidual. These person-speciﬁc means are then subtracted from the observed values of each
variable and the difference in the dependent measure is regressed on the difference in
the independent variable(s) (Allison 2009). Like other family transitions, the full effects
of fostering on households may not be instantaneous. Therefore, comparing household
wealth pre- and post-fostering is more appropriate than estimating the immediate effect
of receiving a foster child in a one-wave interval. Thus for ﬁxed effects estimation, once
a respondent’s household has fostered a child, I considered it a fostering household in all
subsequent waves (as indicated in Figure 1).
To ensure that exposure to fostering precedes changes in household wealth, I structure
the data so that anticipation and reported fostering are combined (discussed above) and
are used to predict changes in future household wealth. In other words, fostering a child
between Waves 1 and 2 is used to assess changes in household wealth that take place
from Wave 3 onward. Similarly, fostering that occurred between Waves 5 and 6 is used
to assess changes in household wealth in Waves 7 and 8. This technique ensures that a
contemporaneous change in household wealth can not be confused with a real effect of
fostering or that a change in household wealth prompted a household to foster a child.
5. Results
Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of the pooled time-series data. The characteristics
of the pooled data are highly consistent with the cross sectional data taken from Wave 2
(see Appendix A, Table A2), with some expected differences (e.g., increasing educational
attainment and a higher percentage of marriage as respondents move through the life
course, which is reﬂected in the pooled data).
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Table 1: Fostering characteristics and descriptive statistics for pooled
time-series data
Variable Mean S.D. Range
Household Wealth  0:09 1:70 –1.85 – 9.36
% Fostered a child 19:4 0:40 0 – 1
% Surprised 2:9 0:17 0 – 1
% Anticipated 2:7 0:16 0 – 1
% Uncertain 13:8 0:35 0 – 1
Household Size 4:8 2:18 1 – 18
Years of Education 7:3 2:73 0 – 13
% Married 44:1 0:50 0 – 1
% Student 34:1 0:47 0 – 1
Monthly Income (thousands of Kwacha) 2:3 6:99 0 – 250
% Moved household 12:6 0:33 0 – 1
N=10,987 person-waves representing 1754 individuals
Over the course of the study, most households experienced a net gain in wealth, but
this gain was not universal across households. An examination of the household wealth
measure (not shown) reveals that 42% of households experience a net increase in wealth
between Waves 2 and 8. Approximately one third (31%) of households experienced a net
decline in household wealth, while about a quarter showed no net change over the same
time period.
Within each wave analyzed, the incidence of new fostering among households ranged
between 4 and 11%. Exposure to fostering within the pooled data represents 19% of all
person-waves analyzed. Table 1 shows the percent of fostering experiences disaggregated
into anticipation categories. Surprised and anticipated fostering make up roughly equal
proportions of fostering experiences (15% and 13%, respectively), while, as expected,
uncertain fostering represents the majority of fostering circumstances.
Table 2 shows the bivariate association between the fostering categories and key in-
dependent variables. This table is split into two panels: the top panel, which measures
variables at Wave 1 of the study before the measured fostering events took place,11 and
a bottom panel, which shows the average across all observations in the pooled dataset.
The top panel reveals that at the beginning of the observed interval, respondents whose
household eventually fostered a child are, on average, more educated and wealthier than
11The most recent fostering experience was used to categorize respondents whose household fostered multiple
times in the interval observed.
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respondents whose household did not foster a child. Interestingly, households that even-
tually fostered and anticipated doing so began the study with lower household wealth
than households that fostered under other circumstances. This suggests that wealth is not
necessarily a pre-requisite for the ability to anticipate fostering responsibilities.
The patterns in the top panel of Table 2 are largely reﬂected in the pooled data (bot-
tom panel of Table 2). The notable exception is among households who fostered a child
and anticipated doing so. When observations are averaged across the pooled data, house-
holds that fostered out of anticipation are not less notably less wealthy than other types of
households that fostered.
Table 2: Mean values for key variables by fostering categories
Measured at baseline before fostering occurred
Fostering Category
Variable Non-Fosterers Surprised Anticipated Uncertain
Household Wealth  0:31 0:13  0:12 0:20
Household size 4:98 5:57 4:88 5:01
Years of Education 7:01 7:73 7:24 7:55
% Married 35:72 24:71 50:00 38:14
Monthly Income (thousands of Kwacha) 1:95 1:74 2:58 2:32
N=1750 individuals for whom information was available at Wave 1
Pooled time-series data
Household Wealth  0:17 0:31 0:23 0:25
Household Size 4:95 4:78 4:52 4:29
Years of Education 7:19 8:23 7:55 7:79
% Married 42:90 31:33 58:02 50:95
Monthly Income (thousands of Kwacha) 2:21 1:78 4:16 2:55
N=10,987 person-waves representing 1754 individuals
5.1 Multivariate analysis
Ibeginbyassessingthegeneralpatternofwealthovertimeforhouseholds. Ithenestimate
the effects of fostering as a binary status by comparing those whose household fostered
a child to those who did not. Before examining the role of anticipation, I establish the
validity of TLT’s measure of anticipation of fostering. Finally, to understand whether
and how anticipation of fostering may produce differential outcomes for foster families,
I estimate models that treat fostering as an event conditioned by anticipation to assess its
consequences for household wealth.
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5.1.1 Fostering as a binary status
Model 1 in Table 3 contains the results of the ﬁrst ﬁxed-effects time series model, which
simply evaluates how household wealth changed over the observed interval. In the ab-
sence of any controls, household wealth in this sample increased marginally over time.
Model 2 in Table 3 estimates the effect of fostering, as a binary status, on household
wealth, controlling for time. This model indicates that fostering a child is not associated
with statistically discernible changes in household wealth. This suggests that child foster-
ing has no impact on the wealth of receiving households. However, evidence from previ-
ous studies indicates that receiving a foster child is a heterogeneous experience. Because
fostering may matter for households under certain circumstances, I turn my attention to
evaluating whether the effect of fostering is conditioned by anticipation.
Table 3: Fixed effects regression models of the effect of time and
fostering on household wealth
Model 1000000 Model 2
Time 0:027 0:026
(0:004) (0:004)
Fostering —000000 0:022
—000000 (0:032)
Constant  0:223  0:221
(0:019) (0:019)
Person-waves 10,987000000 10,987000
Individuals 1754000000 1754000
Within-individual R2 0:006 0:006
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
5.1.2 Fostering conditioned by anticipation
Before considering the role of anticipation in outcomes for foster families, I establish
the validity of the anticipation measure of one selected household representative by ex-
amining its relationship with subsequent fostering. Figure 2 shows the proportion of
respondents whose household fostered a child in Wave 2 by their level of anticipation
(as measured in beans) in Wave 1, ﬁtted with a regression line. This ﬁgure shows a clear
relationship between the respondent’s anticipation of fostering and actual future fostering.
http://www.demographic-research.org 1171Bachan: Anticipatory child fostering and household economic security in Malawi
The positive relationship between anticipation and future fostering is robust to a num-
ber of controls. Using logistic regression, I regress fostering at Wave 2 (1=yes, 0=no)
on Wave 1 levels of anticipation, controlling for basic sociodemographic characteristics
such as gender, age, household wealth, and marital status (also measured at Wave 1).
The results indicate that the measure of anticipation is a meaningful predictor of future
fostering, with a person’s odds of fostering a child at Wave 2 increasing by 5% for every
additional bean he or she shifted to the “positive” side of the plate in Wave 1 (p<0.05) (see
Table A3 in Appendix A for full model estimates). Further investigation of the anticipa-
tion measure shows that anticipation of future fostering operates similarly across different
types of respondents within the TLT sample. Supplementary analyses testing for interac-
tion effects with anticipation provided no evidence to suggest that the predictive ability
of anticipation of fostering differs by respondent’s age, marital status, gender, education
level, or socioeconomic status (models not shown but available upon request).
Figure 2: Relationship between anticipation of fostering and subsequent
fostering
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Despite the strong relationship between anticipation of fostering responsibilities and
subsequent fostering, surprised fostering happened within the TLT sample. Nearly 10%
of people who reported fostering at Wave 2 indicated at Wave 1 that there was no chance
of their household fostering a child within the next year. Likewise, slightly less that 15%
of those reporting fostering at Wave 2 had completely anticipated doing so during their
Wave 1 interview.
Model 3 in Table 4 estimates the impact of fostering categorized by prior anticipation
on change in household wealth. This model reveals that fostering had a statistically signif-
icant positive effect on household wealth when it was anticipated. Fostering under these
circumstances was associated with a 0.15 gain in the household wealth score compared to
respondents whose household did not foster within the observation period. Restructuring
the data to ensure fostering preceded changes in household wealth allows us to reasonably
interpret this as an actual gain in wealth rather than a selection effect.
For households that fostered under surprised or uncertain circumstances, we observe
no such advantage. These households experienced neither a signiﬁcant increase nor de-
crease in wealth in comparison to households that did not experience fostering within
the interval observed. However, rotating the reference categories to examine pairwise
relationships shows that fostering had different consequences for those households that
anticipated the event and those that were surprised by it (model not shown). Speciﬁcally,
householdsthatanticipatedfosteringexperiencea0.24increaseinwealthoverhouseholds
that fostered by surprise (p<0.05). Uncertain fostering households, however, remain sta-
tistically indistinguishable from anticipated fosterers in terms of changes to household
wealth.12
One explanation for these ﬁndings could be that the anticipation of fostering—
irrespective of actually fostering a child in the future—is itself associated with an in-
crease in wealth. Perhaps people expect that their household will come into wealth in the
near future, prompting them to also anticipate helping extended family by taking on ad-
ditional childcare responsibilities. To rule out this possibility, I estimate the effect of the
change in the anticipation of future fostering on future changes in household wealth. This
analysis shows that anticipation in and of itself has no relation to household wealth (see
Table A4 in Appendix A). Additionally, there are only weak correlations (r<0.3) between
respondents’ anticipation of fostering and their anticipation of other wealth-related future
events, such as the ability to save money, open a bank account, and/or open a business.
Taken together, this suggests that people who anticipate their household will foster are
not simultaneously anticipating an increase in wealth.
12These results remain robust to addition of control variables.
http://www.demographic-research.org 1173Bachan: Anticipatory child fostering and household economic security in Malawi
Table 4: Fixed effects regression models of the effect on household wealth by
anticipatory fostering status
Model 3000 Model 4
Time 0:026 0:023
(0:004) (0:004)
Prior Anticipation (ref. = non-fosterers)
Surprised Fostering  0:085  0:032
(0:067) (0:067)
Anticipated Fostering 0:152 0:192x
(0:072) (0:071)
Uncertain Fostering 0:023 0:072
(0:036) (0:036)
Sociodemographic controls
Household size 0:064
(0:007)
Years of Education 0:047
(0:020)
Student 0:098x
(0:033)
Married 0:142
(0:036)
Monthly Income (thousands of Kwacha) 0:006
(0:002)
Household move 0:023
(0:025)
Constant  0:221  0:990
(0:019) (0:150)
Person waves 10,98700000 10,987000
Individuals 175400000 1754000
Within-individual R2 0:007 0:020
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Turning to Model 4 in Table 4, we see that the intervening sociodemographic controls
do not explain how anticipation of fostering acts further increase household wealth. After
controlling for a host of other changes, the signiﬁcant effect of anticipated fostering on
household wealth remains and even increases in effect size and signiﬁcance. We also
see that uncertain fostering is associated with a small increase in household wealth in
this model. However, supplementary analyses suggest this latter effect is weak and more
sensitive to the techniques used to categorize fostering (see Table B1 in Appendix B).
Other covariates operate in ways consistent with what we would expect. The addition of a
household member above and beyond the foster child increases household wealth, likely
because the addition of an adult is accompanied by that individual’s capital. In addition,
being enrolled in school and an increase in the respondent’s previous month’s income act
to increase the wealth of a respondent’s household.
6. Summary and discussion
Child fostering in sub-Saharan Africa has long been regarded as a beneﬁcial practice
for households and children. However, little empirical work has explored the impact
of fostering a child for receiving families. This study provides further insight into how
fostering households cope with extra childcare responsibilities over time by testing two
competing hypotheses about how fostering a child effects household wealth. Importantly,
this study takes the perspective that fostering experiences are heterogeneous. Treating
child fostering as conditioned by prior anticipation acknowledges the reciprocal nature of
decision-making among African kin networks.
By illustrating the role of anticipation in outcomes for foster families, this research
demonstrates the importance of accounting for circumstantial factors in research on child
fostering. In this research, the empirical results show that when fostering is treated simply
as an event that either happened or did not happen, fostering does not seem to impact a
household’s wealth within the approximately two-and-a-half years of the study period.
However, conditioning the fostering experience on prior anticipation reveals that house-
hold wealth does change in response to fostering a child under certain circumstances.
Households that anticipated fostering responsibilities experienced signiﬁcant gains in
wealth. This ﬁnding is robust to a host of controls and lends support for Hypothesis
1, which predicted that household wealth increases in response to fostering a child.
The ﬁndings presented in this paper yield new results that are empirically robust and
theoretically coherent. Nevertheless, this study has limitations. First, the TLT sample
is young, and respondents are not necessarily the heads of their households. In using a
relatively young sample, the analysis does not capture “skipped generation” households
containing only foster children and grandparents. Thus, caution should be taken in gen-
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eralizing the ﬁndings for these types of households. It is possible that such households
may not experience the beneﬁts associated with anticipated fostering due to unfavorable
dependency ratios.
A related concern is that this study uses the anticipation reported by one household
member as a proxy for the level of anticipation of the household. However, given the
collective nature of fostering decisions, it is likely that all household members have some
awareness of future fostering—though not all equally. Because of the signiﬁcant predic-
tive ability of the anticipation measure, and because anticipation does not operate differ-
ently for different types of people, the anticipation of the respondent as a representative
household member is validated.
Second, there are limits to relying on a household wealth index as the dependent
variable. Although the use of wealth indices has numerous beneﬁts in contexts for which
data on income and consumption are limited (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Rutstein and
Johnson 2004), such a measure may not accurately capture the entire picture of wealth
in all developing contexts (Bingenheimer 2007). Like many standard wealth indices, the
wealthindexusedinthisstudydoesnotincludemeasuresoflivestockandlandownership.
While these are more traditional forms of wealth in many sub-Saharan African countries,
TLT only measured these assets at the ﬁrst and last wave of the study—an interval that is
too wide for the present analysis. Therefore, the study’s ﬁndings should be interpreted in
relation to more modern, cash-oriented forms of wealth.
Finally, this study does not consider every piece of the fostering puzzle, and there is
more for future research in this area to explain. Speciﬁcally, I do not explore whether
characteristics of the foster child differentially inﬂuence household outcomes. It will be
a productive avenue for future research to account for the parental survival status of the
foster child in order to draw distinctions between households which foster orphans and
households which foster non-orphans. It was also beyond the scope of this research to
look at the movement of foster children in and out of households. While this is important
for future research to consider, it does not compromise the ability to examine household
wealth before and after a fostering event. Given that the time period covered in the study
is relatively short and that the economic effects of fostering a child likely play out over an
extended period of time, this is unlikely to substantially impact the results presented here.
While this study is unable to explain the process by which anticipation acts to increase
wealth among fostering households empirically, evidence from broader literature on child
fosteringallowsustospeculateaboutmechanismsthatthisstudydoesnotconsider. These
may include child labor or domestic work (Ainsworth 1996; Andvig, Canagarajah, and
Kielland 1999; Caldwell 1997; Goody 1982) and incentives received from natal families
(Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe 1989; Dahl 2009; Isiugo-Abanihe 1985). It is possible that
anticipation is related to the degree to which households are able to choose the child
they foster. Households that anticipate fostering may purposely select a child who would
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contribute to the household or may negotiate a favorable arrangement with the sending
family.
An alternative explanation may be that anticipating fostering represents a number
of other qualities that make fostering households more likely to experience an increase
in wealth. For example, anticipation could represent better communication within the
household and between extended kin networks outside the household. If such superior
communication extends into the community at large, it may be indicative of the status of
a household within a community or, at a minimum, serve as a proxy of that household’s
ample access to information and resources.
Prior knowledge of an event reduces uncertainty and increases the ability to plan ac-
cordingly. Thus, anticipation of fostering could allow households to mobilize the neces-
sary resources in advance of receiving a foster child, making the household better able to
productively leverage additional household members. It could be argued that patterns of
superior communication and planning at the household level protect households against
instability more generally. Thus, to the extent that anticipation captures these two at-
tributes, it may represent greater stability within the household.
Fostering households that do not fully anticipate fostering responsibilities may not
experience the same gains in wealth that are associated with anticipated fostering. How-
ever, the fact that these fostering households are not signiﬁcantly worse-off than their
non-fostering counterparts is encouraging, especially considering that these households—
particularly the “surprised” households—may have experienced fostering as a true
“shock.” In other words, despite recent concerns about the toll that orphanhood and child
care responsibilities are taking on African families (Barnett and Blaikie 1992; Gregson,
Mushati, and Nyamukapa 2007), fostering under perhaps less-than-optimal circumstances
may not be hurting households economically. Still, more research is needed to tease out
how the variety of circumstances under which fostering takes place differentially effects
fostering households.
I have attempted to offer explanations for why anticipatory fostering, in particular,
contributes positively to changes in household wealth. However, these explanations are
speculative, and more work is needed to understand the meaning of anticipation as it re-
lates to the process of child fostering. While TLT provides a rich dataset for initiating such
an inquiry, without data on household decision-making, communication, and indicators
of community status, the true role of anticipation must be left for future studies on this
topic. Likewise, anticipation is but one aspect that characterizes a fostering situation. To
ascertainafullerpictureoftheexperienceforfosteringhouseholds, futureresearchshould
consider how the effects of other surrounding circumstances, such as the characteristics
of the foster child (e.g., age, relationship to the household head, gender) shape household
outcomes. Moreover, wealth is only one measure of household wellbeing. Studies focus-
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ing on fostering households should also explore changes in household food security and
members’ health to understand other ways receiving a foster child impacts households.
While the orphan crisis is certainly impacting sub-Saharan Africa, additional caretak-
ing responsibilities may not be as detrimental to the African household as conventional
wisdom suggests or as other scholars have speculated. In the current study context, child
fostering does not seem to damage the wealth of host households. In fact, under some cir-
cumstances, households that absorb a foster child may experience net economic beneﬁts
over time. This supports the idea that child fostering continues to be a highly functional
system in certain sub-Saharan African contexts. The ﬁndings also indicate that the system
of child fostering deserves to be examined in more complexity.
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Appendix A: Supplementary tables
Table A1: Comparison of full and analytic sub-sample for key variables
Full Sample Analytic Sample
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Household wealth  0:13 1:8  0:09 1:7
% Fostered a child 19:3 0:4 19:4 0:4
Household Size 5:1 2:2 4:8 2:2
Years of Education 7:4 2:7 7:3 2:7
% Married 41:4 0:5 44:1 0:5
% Student 36:9 0:5 34:1 0:5
Monthly Income (thousands of Kwacha) 2:3 7:2 2:3 7:0
Moved house 12:8 0:3 12:6 0:3
Person-waves 14,555 10,987
Individuals 2080 1754
Table A2: Cross-sectional description of sample at the beginning of the
observed interval (Wave 2)
Variable Mean S.D. Range
Household wealth  0:11 1:73 –1.85 – 8.15
Household Size 5:10 2:18 1 – 14
Years of Education 7:11 2:72 0 – 13
% Married 39:00 0:49 0 – 1
% Student 43:1 0:50 0 – 1
Monthly Income (thousands of Kwacha) 2:35 8:37 0 – 250
(N=1684 individuals)
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Table A3: Wave 1 predictors of fostering in Wave 2
Odds Ratio
Anticipation level 1:053
(0:026)
Household wealth 1:180
(0:052)
Married 1:820x
(0:383)
Gender (ref.=male) 1:195
(0:239)
Years of Education 1:061
(0:036)
Age 0:970
(0:031)
Monthly Income (thousands of Kwacha) 1:00
(0:014)
Constant 0:084
(0:050)
Individuals 1668000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; all predictor variables measured at wave 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05
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Table A4: Fixed effects regression model of the independent effect of
anticipation on household wealth
Coefﬁcient
Fostering (ref. = non-fosterers) 0:022
(0:032)
Anticipation of Fostering  0:001
(0:003)
Time 0:026
(0:004)
Constant  0:219
(0:021)
Person Waves 10,987000
Individuals 1754000
Within individual R2 0:006
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Appendix B: Expanding the deﬁnition of anticipated and surprised
fostering
Supplementary analyses explored the effect of anticipation using different cut-points to
deﬁne surprised and anticipated fostering. Expanding the deﬁnition of surprised fostering
to include those who selected either a 0- or 1-bean chance of fostering and anticipated
fostering to include respondents who selected either a 9- or 10-bean chance of fostering
produced similar results. Table B1 shows the results of the multivariate analyses using
these new categorical deﬁnitions. Anticipated fosterers under the expanded deﬁnition
continue to experience a signiﬁcantly larger increase in wealth than their non-fostering
counterparts. But unlike Model 4 in Table 4, uncertain fosterers do not experience a
statistically distinguishable change in wealth under this new deﬁnition, suggesting that the
effect of uncertain fostering is less robust than that of anticipated fostering. Furthermore,
households that fostered out of anticipation under this expanded deﬁnition continue to
show a signiﬁcantly greater increase in wealth than their surprised counterparts (p<0.01,
model not shown).
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Table B1: Fixed effects regression models of the effect on household wealth by
anticipatory fostering status (expanded anticipation cut-points)
Model 1 Model 2
Time 0:026 0:024
(0:004) (0:004)
Prior Anticipation (ref. = non-fosterers)
Surprised Fostering  0:049 0:007
(0:057) (0:057)
Anticipated Fostering 0:171x 0:202x
(0:066) (0:065)
Uncertain Fostering  0:004 0:044
(0:040) (0:038)
Sociodemographic controls
Household Size 0:064
(0:007)
Years of Education 0:047
(0:020)
Student 0:099x
(0:033)
Married 0:141
(0:036)
Monthly Income (thousands of Kwacha) 0:006
(0:002)
Household Move 0:023
(0:025)
Constant  0:222  0:981
(0:019) (0:150)
Person-waves 10,987000 10,987000
Individuals 1754000 1754000
Within individual R2 0:007 0:020
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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